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Abstract
In the 1960s and 1970s, many articles were written and speeches delivered on international
competition law. In the last few years, however, the topic has been given a new and much wider
meaning. The changing world economy and increasing internationalization of business transac-
tions have created a new, global environment and new challenges for competition policy. Increas-
ingly, developments outside of one’s own market sphere have an impact on one’s local competitive
situation.
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In the 1960s and 1970s, many articles were written and
speeches delivered on international competition law. In the last
few years, however, the topic has been given a new and much
wider meaning.
The changing world economy and increasing international-
ization of business transactions have created a new, global envi-
ronment and new challenges for competition policy. Increas-
ingly, developments outside of one's own market sphere have an
impact on one's local competitive situation.
In earlier years, the focus was mainly on the extraterritorial
application of competition laws. This extraterritoriality was es-
sentially a characteristic of the American antitrust laws, which
are very broad in scope and apply not only to restrictions on
competition within the U.S. market, but also to restrictions else-
where which affect U.S. exports. In reality, however, this extra-
territorial antitrust capability was not often used and, for a
number of years, was even explicitly rejected by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice.
A more frequently occurring problem related to the gather-
ing of information located abroad. This often led to angry reac-
tions from countries on whose territory the requested informa-
tion was located. Because no clearly defined international rules
on jurisdiction existed, countries tried other means of limiting
the extraterritorial application of competition laws. On the mul-
tilateral level, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") issued a Recommendation concerning
cooperation between member countries on restrictive business
practices affecting international trade. The bilateral approach
was followed by a number of countries who concluded coopera-
tion agreements. Other countries preferred a unilateral re-
* Director General for Competition, EC Commission. Dr. Ehlermann was speak-
ing at a Japan-EC Competition Seminar in Tokyo, Japan, on November 4, 1993.
834 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 17:833
sponse and adopted so-called "blocking statutes" that prohibited
their nationals and companies from informing foreign public
authorities, in any manner, about documents or information
where this would impair the nation's sovereignty or essential in-
terests.
All of these responses were defensive in nature. They
sought to limit the extraterritorial application of competition
laws. It is hard to judge how successful these measures were,
other than to say that over the years major conflicts have been
rare. There have been a few, however, the most obvious exam-
ple which springs to mind being the Laker case.
The European Union ("Union" or "EU") neither adopted a
blocking statute, nor did it conclude any bilateral agreements of
this type. It has seriously considered both of these possibilities,
however, and although the Union itself decided that it was not
the right time to adopt such measures, some of our Member
States did adopt them. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany
concluded a bilateral agreement with the U.S., while blocking
statutes were adopted by France and the United Kingdom. The
EU relied essentially on the notification system set up under the
OECD Recommendation. Up until the end of the 1980s, this led
to satisfactory results in most cases. In the beginning of the pres-
ent decade, however, or as you would say in Japan, more or less
since the beginning of Heisei, the changing world economy and
increasing internationalization of business transactions created a
new environment and, at the same time, some new challenges
for competition policy.
Traditionally competition authorities have focused mainly
on their own markets, but the process of internationalization
that is taking place everywhere means that, increasingly, develop-
ments outside of one's own market have an impact on the com-
petitive situation within that market. As I explained earlier, the
extraterritorial aspects of certain competition policy enforce-
ment measures have been clear to people for quite some time.
Increasingly, however, the actual practices and structures them-
selves also have such extraterritorial effects. No multilateral
1. This reference is to a series of related cases in which Laker Airways Limited, a
British airline, brought action against American and foreign defendants under Ameri-
can antitrust laws. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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rules exist to deal with this kind of extraterritorial effect. They
do, however, exist at the regional level in Europe. In fact, it is
the Union that has been the main driving force behind such
rules, which is why I would like to return to them in a moment.
No such rules exist, however, in EU relations with non-European
countries, such as Japan and the United States. The Union has,
therefore, been thinking about ways of remedying this vacuum.
Although multilateral rules would provide the broadest coverage
and, therefore, deal with the issue in the most comprehensive
manner possible, their negotiation would be, without any doubt,
a complicated and thus time-consuming process. We decided
therefore, as a first step, to negotiate a bilateral agreement with
the U.S. Those negotiations, between the European Commis-
sion and the U.S. Department ofJustice and Federal Trade Com-
mission, began in early 1991 and were successfully concluded,
after just a few months of discussions, on September 23, 1991.
The resulting Agreement Between the Government of the
United States and the Commission of the European Communi-
ties Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws2 (the
"Agreement") draws upon the positive aspects of earlier bilateral
agreements on competition policy, which it then takes an impor-
tant step further.
The more traditional elements of the Agreement are a noti-
fication requirement and an "exchange of information" clause.
Under these, one party has to inform the other, inter alia, when
it is taking actions which may affect the other party's important
interests. These clauses have drawn a lot of attention from com-
panies and lawyers in Europe, who were afraid the clauses would
be used to "ship" important information across the Atlantic
Ocean. However, one has to read these clauses in combination
with the provisions on confidentiality. Because the confidential-
ity requirements on both sides are drawn fairly narrowly, the ac-
tual amount of information exchanged has to remain limited.
More importantly, the notification requirement is not an end in
itself. Rather, it is meant to facilitate the application of the
Agreement's three main provisions, namely, the Cooperation
Clause and the Positive and Negative Comity Clauses.
2. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Compe-
tition Laws, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991), 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1534, at 382 (Sept. 26, 1991).
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The clause that most reflects the traditional approach to
limiting the extraterritorial application of competition rules is
the Comity Clause, now often referred to as the Negative Comity
Clause to distinguish it from the Positive Comity Clause. This
far-reaching comity provision provides that each party shall take
into account, at all stages in its enforcement activities, the impor-
tant interests of the other party. It then gives some fairly de-
tailed criteria for deciding when and how this should be done.
It is important to point out, however, that the Comity Clause
applies within the framework of the laws, and to the extent com-
patible with 'the important interests, of the enforcing party.
The purpose of the Comity Clause is clearly to limit one
party's enforcement activities, so as to minimize any negative ef-
fects on the other party's interests. The parties to the Agree-
ment felt, however, that equally important effects on one party's
interests might occur when a party did not enforce its laws
against anticompetitive practices on its own territory. In a case
where such anticompetitive practices would, for instance, create
an obstacle for imports from the other party, the latter could be
interested in the elimination of those practices. That is precisely
what the Positive Comity Clause is intended to facilitate. In
other words, whenever one party's important interests are af-
fected by anticompetitive practices within the other party's terri-
tory, the affected party may ask the other to investigate the situa-
tion under its own laws and take any remedial action it may
deem appropriate. From the point of view of a traditional lawyer
or administrator worried mainly about problems of extraterrito-
riality, the Agreement therefore provides for a rather sophisti-
cated response. First, it tells the parties to limit enforcement as
much as possible in order to minimize negative effects on the
other party's interests. It also provides an answer in cases where
the U.S., under its broadly drawn competition rules, would like
to take action under American law against anticompetitive prac-
tices in the EU which would affect American exports. In such a
case the Agreement gives a preferred solution under which the
U.S. should first ask the EU to apply EU rules to such a practice,
rather than applying U.S. law extraterritorially.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the Positive
Comity Clause does much more than simply provide an answer
in the case of such problems of extraterritoriality. It is, in fact,
the most innovative feature of the Agreement, and takes us right
[Vol. 17:833
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into the major debate about the relationship between trade and
competition policies.
Naturally, with the success of the positive comity provision's
use at a bilateral level, it was thought to be of primary impor-
tance to initiate its inclusion at a suitable multilateral level.
Therefore, it was with some mark of success that it was adopted
in certain codes, in particular the TRIPS and Services Codes,
with their provisions on restrictive business practices, of the Uru-
guay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT),' which concluded on Dec. 15, 1993 after 2643 days of
negotiations amongst the 107 current GATT Member States.
The Uruguay Round of the GATT addressed not only the
consolidation and the reduction of tariff and non-tariff meas-
ures, but also covered areas such as intellectual property, services
and trade-related investment measures. It also encompassed in a
single undertaking the Final Act creating the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO), a Memorandum of Understanding on dis-
pute settlement procedures, a wide range of expanded Codes
(Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), procurement, subsidies,
dumping, etc.), and comprehensive sectoral agreements.
The inclusion of the concept of positive comity in the Uru-
guay Round of the GATT provides a building block towards es-
tablishing an international competition policy, which will take
into account the globalization of the international economy.
This concept and the response of a possible international com-
petition authority will be discussed below.
Let us now consider the Agreement's third main article, the
Cooperation Clause. This article is also fairly innovative, as it
contains implicitly the so-called "who-goes-first" procedure. This
procedure applies in cases where both parties are simultaneously
looking at the same practice or structure. In such a case, one
party may decide to hold back its enforcement activities until the
other has reached a decision. If that decision also solves the for-
mer party's problems, that party may decide that it no longer
needs to take independent action. It is clear that such a situa-
tion will arise most frequently in the case of mergers. Because
3. GATT SECRETARIAT, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS § II-A1A-3, 4, 7, A1B, AIC (1993). GATT was
established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187, opened for signature Oct. 3, 1947.
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both the EU and the U.S. are required by law to deal expedi-
tiously with merger cases, however, this is also the area where
there is the least scope to utilize this procedure. Thus, it will be
limited essentially to cases which deal with behavioral phenom-
ena, rather than with structures.
Despite the successful conclusion of the EU-U.S. bilateral
Agreement, its legal basis is uncertain due to a challenge by the
French Government, which contends that the Commission
lacked the authority to conclude such an agreement, and that
the Agreement should have been approved by the EU Council of
Ministers. The European Court ofJustice is considering the case
at present, and a decision is expected by autumn 1994. The
Commission remains confident that a decision will be rendered
in favor of the legality of the Agreement.
If the decision is a positive one, then the EU will continue to
conclude more such agreements on a bilateral basis - with Can-
ada being the next negotiating partner. A largely similar agree-
ment has already been negotiated with the Canadian competi-
tion authority. If the Court of Justice decision were to recognize
the right in principle of the Commission to conclude coopera-
tion agreements, but rule that the Commission overstepped the
limits imposed by its powers, then some modifications would
have to be made to the Agreement so that it would withstand
further attack without losing its essential provisions. One of the
essential provisions is the one on positive comity, which provides
for the cooperation between the EU and the U.S. on applying
their own competition rules within their own respective borders
against restrictive business practices. Thereafter, the EU will
continue its course of bilateral antitrust agreements while work-
ing towards the eventual establishment of multilateral interna-
tional competition rules.
However, if the Court were to decide that the Commission
does not have any power to conclude such cooperation agree-
ments, then a formal international treaty would have to be nego-
tiated, with approval by legislative bodies on both sides.4
4. France v. Commission, Case C-327/91, (Eur. Ct. J. Aug. 9, 1994) (not yet re-
ported). In its judgment, the Court of Justice found that the agreement should not
have been concluded by the Commission, but by the Council. In a press release issued
the same day, the Commission declared:
The Commission is convinced that the agreement has so far proved beneficial
in enhancing good cooperation between the relevant competition authorities
[Vol. 17:833
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The usefulness of bilateral agreements such as the one be-
tween the EU and the U.S. is that they address not only public
barriers to trade, but also private ones. The Havana Charter'
(the "Charter"), which never entered into force, recognized that
anticompetitive practices in one market may affect the impor-
tant interests of another Party. The Charter laid down rules not
only on governmental restraints to trade, such as tariffs and non-
tariff barriers, but also rules on private restraints, as well as includ-
ing a comprehensive chapter on what is termed restrictive business
practices.
The Charter's emphasis on both private and public re-
straints provided a broader approach to trade liberalization. It
recognized that private barriers to trade are just as important in
restricting markets as are public or governmental restraints.
However, the multilateral trade rounds such as the GATT, which
replaced the Havana Charter, left untouched private restrictive
practices. Consequently, there has not been as much success in
opening markets in countries, such as Japan, where exclusionary
behavior, biased distribution systems, and other private prac-
tices, can protect markets and prevent fair and open competi-
tion.
Although the GATT has developed over the years into a
rather mature regulatory system, which combines substantive
rules with a reasonably successful enforcement system, it did not
contain the Charter's two-track approach to trade liberalisation.
Instead, it dealt essentially with the more traditional governmen-
tal restraints to trade. Therefore, the area of private barriers to
trade, in particular, lacks an international regime that even
closely resembles that of the GATT structure. This narrow ap-
proach to trade liberalization taken by the GATT, and the lack of
viable alternative multilateral procedures against private barriers
to trade, are now increasingly creating difficulties.
on an international level. It will therefore take the appropriate steps to ensure
that the formal requirements for a correct conclusion of the agreement will be
put in place as quickly as possible.
Since Member States have in essence not questioned its substance the Com-
mission expects the agreement will be approved without difficulty by the
Council in order to maintain close cooperation and coordination between the
competition authorities of the European Union and the United States.
5. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N.
Doc. E/CONF 2/78, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3206 (1948).
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The issue did not arise in the same manner when tariffs
were high and non-tariff barriers were still very important. At
that time, international trade had not attained the importance
that it has today. However, with the reduction of trade barriers,
the process of internationalization and globalization of manufac-
turing and sourcing came under way. Now anticompetitive prac-
tices in one market may deny companies access to markets they
normally should have been able to enter into given the deletion
of the governmental trade barriers. Even with the Uruguay
Round of the GATT successfully concluded, it does not solve the
issue of private barriers to trade.
The various rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have
reduced tariffs to overall levels at which they no longer create a
serious obstacle to trade. Important progress has also been
achieved in the reduction of non-tariff barriers. As a result,
those countries which used to rely mainly on tariffs and non-
tariff barriers for the protection of their market, as was the case
in the EU and the U.S., now have seen those barriers come down
and their markets opened up to foreign competitors. Other
markets were not protected as much, or in any case, not exclu-
sively, by governmental barriers.
The result has been an unbalanced situation in which mar-
ket access opportunities are unevenly distributed and EU compa-
nies cannot compete on a level playing field with companies
from closed markets. Although the EU has in place a successful
regulatory scheme and effective enforcement at the suprana-
tional level against anticompetitive practices, its internal meas-
ures are not sufficient to deal with the widening problem of re-
strictive business practices in third countries.
Now that the Uruguay Round has been concluded, a discus-
sion should start in the GATT and its successor authority, the
World Trade Organization, on extending the international trade
rules to cover private restraints to trade, such as restrictive busi-
ness practices. The WTO will employ a quasi-judicial integrated
dispute settlement system covering, amongst others, goods, serv-
ices, subsidies, and intellectual property rights, all of which are
relevant to competition cases. Competition rules within the
WTO structure could further the goal of a unified and coherent
structure for the regulation of international economic relations.
A coherent policy towards competition rules on the interna-
COMPETITION POLICY
tional level is necessary due to the integration of economies, the
continuing growth of the volume of international trade in goods
and services, the increase in foreign direct investment, the rising
importance of multinational companies, and the increasing op-
erations of private actors, such as mergers and joint ventures. All
of these factors weigh against applying several different substan-
tive rules from several different jurisdictions. As competition
rules are different from country to country, there needs to be
some consensus and coordination among competition authori-
ties to achieve a level playing field in the global market.
Reaching such a consensus on international competition
policy is important because, firstly, it could address the anticom-
petitive behavior of third country businesses whose actions result
in distortions of competition in the EU's internal market. Sec-
ondly, it could create a level playing field for European industry
in third country markets, which can only be achieved if there are
no obstacles to market access.
In fact, the EU would prefer to see its two-track approach to
competition policy adopted at the international level, with the
removal of both public and private barriers to trade. The EU's
objective in any international competition policy would follow
the same concept as its own internal market policy, i.e., to en-
sure that markets in third countries are as open as the EU's own
market.
The EU has been considering recently the adoption of in-
ternational competition regulations with effective implementa-
tion procedures at the international level. The multilateral rules
created under an international competition code would have to
be very clearly stated, with the minimum level of anticompetitive
practices set high enough so that the competition rules can be
effectively implemented.
Any successful regulatory scheme must necessarily contain
effective means of implementation, which requires a profound
knowledge of the facts at hand. The difficulty with this proposal
is that a precise knowledge of the facts may be difficult to obtain
solely through the national competition authority. Evidence
that is hard to produce in one's own territory is even more diffi-
cult to obtain when it takes place in another's territory. Due to
increasing economic interdependence, companies have impor-
tant disincentives against turning in another company. Forcing
1994]
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the relevant parties to reveal the facts may actually result in the
destruction of the proof needed to sanction the enterprises con-
cerned.
In addition, the regulatory scheme must provide for the de-
velopment of cooperation procedures at the international level,
including a method of concerted action and an exchange of in-
formation mechanism. Several approaches can be taken to ad-
dress this problem.
The most ambitious solution would be to put into place an
international competition authority, which would be given pow-
ers of investigation and decision-making in monitoring the com-
petitive behavior of enterprises at the international level, to be
enforced through the national courts. This was a proposal of an
international group of private competition experts called the
"Fikentscher Group", in their draft international competition
code. However, this proposal would mean that the international
competition authority could enforce the rules within every con-
tracting Party's territory, even if it conflicted with a decision
taken by the contracting Party's own competition authority. At
least in the beginning, such a system might be politically unac-
ceptable and, therefore, unrealistic.
A second approach would be to submit conflicts between
States on the application of the proposed international competi-
tion code to an international competition panel. However, as a
panel cannot deal directly with specific undertakings and their
behavior, it would not be able to ensure directly compliance with
the rules in a timely fashion. As a panel procedure would leave
actual enforcement to the national competition authorities, the
potential to interfere with the decisions of these authorities
would be reduced. Despite the drawback of direct review of
compliance with its rulings, a panel may be useful either on its
own or in conjunction with the establishment of an international
competition authority, in order to provide a system which would
subtly pressure reluctant or weak competition authorities to be-
come more assertive.
The third approach would be to develop and reinforce at
the multilateral level procedures for cooperation between com-
petition authorities, similar to what has been achieved with the
EU-U.S. bilateral antitrust agreement. This type of agreement
could be readily adapted for the multilateral level, with the mini-
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mum requirement being the inclusion of a clause based on the
principle of positive comity, as discussed above.
Naturally this final approach has some faults as well, as most
States will believe this type of agreement is a double-edged
sword. There has to be some education of the parties involved,
therefore, to get them to realize that it is in the interests of both
countries concerned to fight anticompetitive practices.
The role of industry is essential in this regard, as they can
see first-hand the practical problems resulting from restrictive
business practices. Industry must be convinced of the benefits of
this procedure, and should provide the authority with any infor-
mation on third-country restrictions on competition that affect
their exports, so that the principle of positive comity will work in
the way it was intended. Therefore, the confidentiality of indus-
try's role in the proper functioning of an information exchange
mechanism at a multilateral level, based on the principle of posi-
tive comity, must be assured. If industry can overcome its natu-
ral reluctance to provide information for fear of exposure to
their competitors or business collaborators, and also in fear that
the same methods used against their competitors would be used
against them, then this approach may be a successful one, and
one that could be rapidly achieved.
This idea of an exchange of information mechanism is also
necessary in order to help antitrust authorities in each country
obtain information from other countries in an antitrust suit. For
instance, in the EU, there are legal barriers to the exchange of
confidential business information from the EU to third coun-
tries - namely, Regulation 17/62, Article 20.6 This regulation re-
quires professional secrecy regarding the confidential business
information provided by industry to the European Commission.
Presently, the authorization of the company involved is necessary
before any confidential business information can be exchanged
between states. This means that the company involved may be
reluctant to participate in an information exchange mechanism.
If the antitrust authority is entirely dependent on the company's
assistance, the result could be a total lack of cooperation and an
ineffective multilateral exchange mechanism.
There is no such requirement when information is used be-
tween the European Commission and an EU Member State. In-
6. O.J. C-204, at 62 (1962).
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formation can be provided to a Member State without the com-
pany's permission, as long as the information is handled in ac-
cordance with the judgement in the Spanish Banks case.7 In the
Spanish Banks case, the European Court of Justice held that any
information transmitted by the EU to another State's competent
enforcing authority may not be used by the receiving authority
directly in procedures before it. However, this does not prevent
the enforcing authority from instituting its own investigations
and obtaining the information separately.
This example is rather specific because of the involvement
of the EU Member State in the proceedings before the Euro-
pean Commission. It may not be readily transposable to the in-
ternational level to provide an effective procedure for the ex-
change of information between competition authorities. Never-
theless, we have to find a solution that would allow for a real
exchange of information between competition authorities with-
out jeopardizing industry's cooperation. We need to assure in-
dustry that confidentiality at the multilateral level will be guaran-
teed to some extent. As industry's cooperation is essential to the
success of such a system, efforts must be made to obtain their
cooperation and assent without limiting the effectiveness of the
information mechanism.
Although the above approaches have centered mainly on
governmental action, not all countries rely on the government
for enforcement of their competition rules. For example, in the
U.S., private enforcement plays an important role. The EU is
also attempting to encourage victims of anti-competitive prac-
tices to use the available court procedures to achieve relief.
Even where private action is legally possible, however, there are
still cultural and other barriers to private action becoming an
attractive option for a large number of enterprises.
In conclusion, the recent GATT accord is an important step
in moving towards trade liberalization and the eventual disman-
tling of competition restraints on a multilateral scale. The insti-
tution of competition rules to restrain private anticompetitive
behavior can be initiated through the GATT and WTO proce-
dures on a multilateral level. The successful conclusion of the
7. Direcci6n General de la Competencia v. Asociaci6n Espafiola de Banca Privada
E.A., Case C-67/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4785, [-] - C.M.L.R. - (regarding banks' alleged
infringement of competition laws in area of banking services and commissions).
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EU-U.S. bilateral Agreement on antitrust provides a framework
for increased activity on behalf of the EU in the area of bilateral
antitrust cooperation agreements with other countries. Eventu-
ally, the possibility of instituting international competition rules
and an international competition authority may be considered
as one of the final methods to regulate the increasingly impor-
tant international dimension to each country's economic policy.
This should include a system of interstate cooperation as an es-
sential provision in order to break down barriers to trade on
both the public and private spheres. Although the EU's experi-
ence in eliminating private barriers to trade is not the only
model, applying its concepts internationally may provide the ap-
propriate framework to obtain a truly level playing field in the
international marketplace.
